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Abstract—
Remote attestation (RA) authenticates code running in trusted
execution environments (TEEs), allow trusted code to be deployed
even on untrusted hosts. However, trust relationships established
by one component in a distributed application may impact the
security of other components, making it difficult to reason about
the security of the application as a whole. Furthermore, tradi-
tional RA approaches interact badly with modern web service
design, which tends to employ small interacting microservices,
short session lifetimes, and little or no state.
This paper presents the Decent Application Platform, a
framework for building secure decentralized applications. De-
cent applications authenticate and authorize distributed enclave
components using a protocol based on self-attestation certificates,
a reusable credential based on RA and verifiable by a third
party. Components mutually authenticate each other not only
based on their code, but also based on the other components they
trust, ensuring that no transitively-connected components receive
unauthorized information. While some other TEE frameworks
support mutual authentication in some form, Decent is the only
system that supports mutual authentication without requiring
an additional trusted third party besides the trusted hardware’s
manufacturer. We have verified the secrecy and authenticity
of Decent application data in ProVerif, and implemented two
applications to evaluate Decent’s expressiveness and performance:
DecentRide, a ride-sharing service, and DecentHT, a distributed
hash table. On the YCSB benchmark, we show that DecentHT
achieves 7.5x higher throughput and 3.67x lower latency com-
pared to a non-Decent implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental challenge in building secure decentralized
applications is that untrustworthy nodes may arbitrarily deviate
from their expected behavior. A remote service may appear
to execute a well-known system component when in fact it
is executing a maliciously modified version. Trusted execu-
tion environments (TEEs) partially address this challenge by
shifting trust from the host executing the component to the
manufacturer of the host’s hardware. By provisioning unique
private keys to each TEE and certifying the corresponding
public keys, third parties can authenticate messages produced
within a genuine TEE as long as the key is kept secret.1
Of particular interest are messages that attest to what code
is executing within the TEE. These messages, called remote
attestations (RAs), allow a remote node to prove it is executing
an authentic system component.
Authenticating a TEE requires some degree of trust in a
centralized entity such as the chip manufacturer. Once the
1Doing so is not necessarily trivial: implementation errors, side channels,
and physical attacks could potentially leak these keys. We assume the
security of TEE platforms for the purposes of this paper, even though that
is demonstrably untrue for Intel SGX (e.g., [1]).
TEE platform is authenticated, deciding whether to permit the
TEE to access protected resources is determined by the entities
that control those resources. An malicious application running
within an authentic TEE should never be given access to secret
data since the TEE does not prevent it from disclosing secrets
to untrusted parties.
In a decentralized TEE application, mutually distrustful
entities may wish to protect their resources within the same
application, and may disagree on which entities are trusted.
Conceptually, RA places trust in code at the center of a
distributed application’s security. Rather than consider whether
a host will execute a component faithfully, developers can
focus on the intrinsic behavior of the component to ensure
their application behaves as expected.
Current TEE frameworks force programmers to work at
the wrong level of abstraction where they must deal with
many low-level protocol details. These frameworks work fine
for simple scenarios where one host wishes to authenticate
remote code running on another host, such as when a server
wishes to authenticate client code, as illustrated in Figure 1a,
or a client wishes to authenticate server code, as illustrated
in Figure 1b. To authenticate a server component, the server
attests to a cryptographic hash of the code it is executing, signs
it with its private keys and sends it to the client. The client
verifies the signature to ensure the message originated from an
authentic TEE and compares the hash to an expected value.
Even modest extensions of this scenario introduce chal-
lenges. Consider the scenario, illustrated in Figure 2, where
two components wish to mutually authenticate each other.
Each TEE attests to a cryptographic hash of the code it is
executing and sends the signed attestation to the other host.
Authenticating one component to the other is subtly different
than Figure 1 because the verifying component must know
what hash value to expect from the remote host. Otherwise,
the component will be unable to distinguish authorized com-
ponents from unauthorized ones. Hardcoding this value in
the verifying component is not possible for both components
because of a circular dependency: the hash of one component
depends on the hash of the other component.
If we exclude expected code hashes when determining the
hash used to identify a component, then each component must
obtain the expected hashes at runtime. An honest component
must therefore have a way of authenticating the hashes to
prevent attackers (such as the component’s host) from introduc-
ing malicious components in place of the honest component’s
dependencies.
Addressing this circular dependency forces many systems
(e.g., [2], [3], [4], [5]) to introduce trusted third-parties to
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(a) Enclaves attest to a server.
...
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(b) Enclave attests to clients.
Fig. 1: Traditional RA authentication
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Fig. 2: Mutual RA authentication. Enclave A and B cannot
hardcode each other’s identity directly in their code since it
creates a circular dependency.
sign binaries or configurations to prevent malicious hosts from
subverting applications by introducing a malicious component.
We are unaware of prior work that solves the mutual au-
thentication problem in its general form. Beekman et al. [6]
propose a work-around that combines components into a single
binary that is running in different modes for each component.
This method clearly does not scale to applications with many
components, and may not even be practical for moderately
sized components if the memory available to the TEE is
limited.2
Even if one component has hardcoded hashes, if any com-
ponent it (transitively) depends on loads hashes dynamically,
its security could be compromised. For example, in Figure 3,
suppose component A authenticates B against a hash of its
code. Since B’s hash is fixed in A’s code, a malicious host
cannot substitute a malicious version of B. However, suppose
B loads the expected hash of C dynamically. Then if B’s
host provides the hash of a malicious component for C, B
may leak A’s messages to C. The core problem is that even
though A authenticated B’s code, it could not authenticate
which components B would trust.
Since it is only possible to hardcode component hashes
that exist at compile time, most TEE applications with mul-
tiple components face some version of the above problems.
If a trusted third party exists, such as a universally-trusted
developer, the problem is easily solved: components could
accept expected hash values that are signed by the developer.
2Intel SGX currently limits the size of the Enclave Page Cache (where
enclave binaries are loaded) to about 90MB of usable space.
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Fig. 3: Allowing hosts to authorize enclaves independently
could permit flows to malicious enclaves.
Note that because information may propagate through multiple
components as in Figure 3, the party must be trusted by all
components in the system. Such a highly trusted entity may not
always exist.3 Even so, were this entity to be compromised, it
would result in catastrophic failure of the security of the system
since the entity’s credentials could arbitrarily change the
components of the system. To ensure the end-to-end security
of distributed and decentralized applications, components need
more flexible and expressive mechanisms for authorization that
do not require universally-trusted entities to enforce.
Another challenge for decentralized TEE applications
arises when components are replicated for scalability. For
example, serverless applications such as those built on AWS
Lambda [7], Google Cloud Functions [8], or Azure Functions
[9], reduce resource costs by factoring their program logic into
stateless components that interact simply with persistent data
storage. If demand for the component suddenly increases, new
replicas are launched to meet the demand. If demand drops off,
replicas may be killed to reclaim their resources. Therefore, to
take full advantage of serverless platforms, components need
to have relatively low startup costs and be able to process
requests from any client, even if a different replica previously
processed requests from the same client.
RA composes poorly with serverless design in part because
an attestation only authenticates a specific replica. Whenever a
client is presented with a new replica, the attestation protocol
must be repeated and authenticated. Repeated attestations can
introduce significant latency. For example, the standard Intel
SGX EPID-based RA protocol requires a client and server
to exchange at least five messages, and additionally requires
communication with the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) to
verify the attestation report [10], [11].4
Distributed TEE applications frequently amortize this cost
by agreeing on some cheaper, ephemeral means of authenti-
3Strictly speaking, all entities in a system secured by TEEs must trust the
TEE manufacturer. In this paper, we assume that entities trust the TEE and its
manufacturer for authentication, but not authorization. That is, entities accept
an attestation as proof of what component is running in a remote TEE, but do
not rely on the manufacturer to determine which components are trustworthy.
A malicious manufacturer (or catastrophic flaw in its implementation) could
subvert the attestation process to authenticate unauthorized TEEs as authorized
ones, but we consider such attacks outside the scope of this paper.
4Intel also supports DCAP [12], which reduces interactions with IAS
by deploying a custom report generating enclave. This enclave must be
authenticated by IAS via a special certification enclave, but verifiers can use
the IAS root certificate to verify attestation reports without contacting IAS.
We discuss DCAP and relate it to our Decent Server in §III-A.
cating future communication such as message authentication
codes (MACs) based on a shared key. Unfortunately, since the
cost of RA is so high, the cost is fully amortized only for
long sessions with many requests. Since most serverless-style
applications frequently spawn new replicas and have relatively
short sessions, reducing the overhead of authenticating new
replicas could significantly improve the performance of appli-
cations that use RA.
Finally, the software development lifecycle also presents
challenges for decentralized TEE applications. RA allows de-
velopers (and indirectly, users) to specify how specific binaries
may interact, but code changes frequently over the lifetime
of an application. Updating one distributed component should
rarely result in downtime for the entire system. Therefore,
developers need a mechanism to securely authorize new com-
ponents and revoke old components even after a system is
deployed.
To address these challenges we have developed the De-
cent Application Platform, a framework for building secure
decentralized applications using TEEs. The major contribu-
tion of this paper is introducing a framework that enables
mutual authentication of dynamic sets of authorized enclave
components in a decentralized, distributed application instance
without requiring additional trusted third parties (other than the
hardware manufacturer). Instead of forcing developers to build
ad-hoc authorization mechanisms on top of remote attestions,
Decent developers refer to the components their application
depends on using a high-level service name. At deployment,
Decent nodes specify an authorization list that defines one
or more components that are authorized to implement each
service. At runtime, the Decent platform authenticates each
remote component and ensures it is authorized to perform the
desired service.
Decent ensures that malicious hosts cannot compromise
the confidentiality or integrity of a Decent application by re-
placing components the application depends on. Since Decent
Components execute within TEEs and are authenticated using
RA, the confidentiality and integrity of the application does
not depend on the trustworthiness of the host or its operator:
any host may provide the service.
We have formalized the Decent protocol in ProVerif [13]
and proven it protects the secrecy and authenticity of the data
it processes. We have also implemented two Decent applica-
tions to evaluate the expressiveness and performance of our
design. DecentRide, a decentralized ride-sharing application,
and DecentHT, a distributed hash table.
We evaluated DecentHT’s on the YCSB [14] benchmark
and compared the overhead of Decent’s authorization mecha-
nisms to a traditional RA approach. Our results demonstrate
that using Decent improves throughput for shorter sessions by
as much as 7.5x and latency by as much as 3.67x. SGX attes-
tation technology such as Intel’s DCAP extensions [12], and
others [15], [16], [17] that avoid interactions with IAS using
mechanisms similar to self-attestation are likely to see similar
tradeoffs depending on how often authentication certificates
must be refreshed with IAS. The source code of Decent SDK,
DecentRide, and DecentHT including the code for benchmark
have been released on GitHub [18].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: §II motivates
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Fig. 4: DecentRide, a decentralized ridesharing service.
the design of Decent using our decentralized ride-sharing
example. §III gives a high-level overview and the design
in depth of the Decent Application Platform. §IV outlines
our implementation, and §V presents the composition and
result of the formal verification for Decent. Moreover, §VI
and §VII evaluate the expressiveness and performance of our
example Decent applications. And, §VIII provides discussions
on existing works that are related to Decent. Finally, §IX
concludes.
II. MOTIVATION: DECENTRIDE
To motivate the design of the Decent framework, we will
use DecentRide, our decentralized ridesharing application, as a
running example. Ridesharing services match riders to drivers
who pick up one or more passengers and drive them to their
desired locations.
Current ridesharing applications are highly centralized.
All aspects of the system are controlled by the ridesharing
company: setting prices, suggesting routes, matching riders
and drivers, and processing payments. Moreover, all the data
associated with these tasks is accessible to the ridesharing
companies, raising concerns for passengers who may wish
their travel patterns and other personal data to be kept con-
fidential. The dominance of current ridesharing companies
also gives drivers few alternatives when prices or policies are
disadvantageous to the drivers’ interests.
A decentralized ridesharing application could address some
of these concerns by letting drivers, passengers, and service
providers self-organize, but designing such an application has
several security challenges. Figure 4 illustrates the interactions
between components of DecentRide, a ridesharing service
loosely based on Uber’s microservice-based design [19].
In a decentralized application, these components may be
hosted by multiple entities, some of which may be untrustwor-
thy. For example, a malicious entity hosting the Trip Planner
component could learn the locations and routes of drivers and
passengers, and a malicious Billing Service component could
manipulate prices. Trusted execution environments are a useful
tool for implementing DecentRide since remote hosts can
establish the authenticity of a remote component via RA, and
communicate over authenticated, encrypted channels that are
inaccessible to the component’s host. Unfortunately, additional
challenges remain.
First, since components may be hosted by untrustworthy
entities, they must mutually authenticate each other, leading
to the circular dependencies described in §I. Resolving these
dependencies requires some authorization data, such as the
hash of each component and the operations allowed for each
component, to be provided by the host at load time. It is
critical that this data cannot be used to subvert the security
of data processed by the application. Furthermore, since some
DecentRide components do not directly connect to each other,
they cannot be directly authenticated and authorized by all
components. Therefore, avoiding transitive trust attacks as
illustrated in Figure 3 is also critical for security. For example,
since the Billing Service only interacts with the Trip Planner,
the host of the Trip Planner might attempt to introduce a
malicious Billing Service to manipulate prices.
Second, distinguishing legitimate updates from malicious
ones is challenging in a decentralized application. Components
that do not exist at compile time, the specifications are cre-
ated, cannot be authorized based on the code they contain.
Therefore, an additional mechanism must be used to authorize
new components. The specific authorization process may be
application specific, but any runtime process that authorizes
new code (or revokes the authorization of existing code) should
itself be authorized by the entities of the system whose security
is at stake; otherwise, the process might be used to introduce
malicious components.
Finally, because of the high cost of authenticating compo-
nents using RA, most TEE applications establish an ephemeral
session key during authentication, amortizing the cost over
the lifetime of the session. Unfortunately, since each compo-
nent in microservice-based designs like DecentRide’s may be
replicated in response to demand (and stopped when demand
drops), the lifetime of each component may be relatively short.
These shorter lifetimes make RA a significant performance
bottleneck, especially for Intel SGX TEEs using EPID-based
RA, where one must contact the Intel Attestation Service
(IAS) [11] to determine whether an attestation is authentic.
III. DECENT SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Building blocks in Decent Framework: The Decent Frame-
work includes Decent Components and Decent Servers.
Trusted code in eachDecent Component and Decent Server
runs in an SGX enclave. Each host runs a single Decent Server
and one or more Decent Components. The Decent Server has
only one purpose, which is to perform self-attestation and issue
certificates to local Decent Components. The detailed process
is introduced in §III-A. Decent Components are enclaves that
hold Decent certificates issued by the Decent Server, and fol-
low Decent protocols to verify peer certificates. There are three
kinds of Decent Components: Decent Apps, Decent Verifiers,
and Decent Revokers. Decent Apps contain all functionalities
of the application. Decent Verifiers and Decent Revokers,
discussed in §III-C and §III-D, concern dynamic authorization
and revocation.
Threat model: The Decent trusted computing base includes
the TEE mechanism, the core Decent libraries, and the appli-
cation code of each honest Decent Component. Decent does
not prevent vulnerabilities in code, but provides a mechanism
for entities in a decentralized application to agree upon which
components should be part of the TCB, and to verify that only
authorized components receive access to protected data.
We assume that honest Decent Components follow the
Decent API specifications and only communicate with peers
that have been authenticated using the Decent protocol. Honest
clients only communicate with components whose Authorized
List consists of Decent Components that the client considers
trustworthy. We assume the security of the TEE mechanism:
computation within the TEE is confidential, hosts can only
interact with the TEE via the interfaces defined by the devel-
oper, and cannot alter the behavior of code within the TEE. We
also assume that attackers cannot compromise cryptographic
mechanisms such as public-key encryption or digital signatures
with non-negligible probability.
Given these assumptions, the Decent system protects
against adversaries that attempt to subvert security in several
ways. Any number of hosts in a Decent application instance
may be malicious. Malicious hosts may attempt to access
and manipulate all inputs and outputs to Decent Components
and Decent Servers, including local memory and storage,
messages between components, and configuration data such
as Authorized Lists. Attackers may also develop and execute
malicious Decent Components and Decent Servers that run
inside or outside the TEE, and that partially or fully violate
the Decent APIs and protocols.
We do not consider information an adversary learns by
analyzing the timing or pattern of communications outside
of the TEE. Complementary approaches exist for eliminat-
ing leaks from indirect or implicit flows (e.g., information
flow control mechanisms [20], [21]), timing channels (e.g.,
predictive mitigation [22]), and access pattern analysis (e.g.,
oblivious computing [23], [24]).
The Decent platform currently only provides confidentiality
and integrity guarantees. TEEs alone cannot provide availabil-
ity guarantees since untrustworthy hosts can always suppress
messages sent to or from the TEE, or simply shutdown the
TEE altogether. We plan to extend the Decent platform with
additional mechanisms for ensuring an application’s services
and data remain available in future work.
A. Authenticating with self-attestations
The first time a Decent Component is executed, it creates
a key pair and initiates the RA protocol to bind the public key
and Authorized List to the code running inside the enclave of
the Decent Component. We call this process “self-attestation”
because the host of the component plays the role of the remote
verifier in the protocol. The goal of self-attestation is not to
authenticate the component to the host (since the host was the
one to launch it), but instead to create a certificate verifiable
by a third party.
Figure 5 illustrates the self attestation process. First, the
Decent Component produces a RA report signed by the
EPID [25] group signing key provisioned by Intel to the CPU.
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Fig. 5: Self Attestation Process
In addition to the platform information and digest of the
component’s code that is usually included in the report, the
Decent Component also includes the fingerprint of the public
key it generated. The host sends this report to the IAS for
verification. If the signature is valid, the IAS returns a signed
response, verifiable by a well-known public key.
Upon receiving and verifying the IAS report, the Decent
Component creates a signed X.509 certificate including the
RA report, its public key, and the Authorized List provided
by the host. By verifying the RA report using Intel’s public
key, third parties can confirm that the public key was created
by a specific Decent Component in an authentic SGX enclave.
By verifying the signature on the certificate, third parties can
confirm the authenticity of the Authorized List.
Self-attestation certificates can also be used to verify out-
puts of a Decent application. For example, the DecentRide
Payment service could provide digital receipts that verify a
user’s payment for a particular trip. By signing the receipt
and attaching its self-attestation certificate, any third party can
verify the contents of the receipt was produced by a legitimate
instance of the DecentRide app containing no unauthorized
components, even if the instance who signs the receipt is no
longer running.
Self-attestation benefits applications like DecentRide by
reducing the latency overhead of component authentication.
Rather than performing RA directly during the authentication
process, Decent Components authenticate each other using
self-attestation certificates created at load time. The traditional
approach of establishing an ephemeral key during RA scales
poorly for applications like DecentRide where component-
to-component sessions may be short lived. Because self-
attestation certificates are reusable across sessions, even ap-
plications with short sessions scale well in Decent.
It is also possible to verify attestations without contacting
IAS using Intel’s recently added DCAP [12] features. DCAP
allows developers to use a local customized service to verify
quotes, reducing the latency generating quote verification re-
ports. Extending Decent to support DCAP would be relatively
simple: instead of using the IAS report as the root of the self-
attestation certificate, the DCAP report would be used instead.
The primary requirement is that the authenticity of custom
DCAP report is verifiable by a third party.
Our prototype separates the concern of generating self-
attestation certificates from the application logic of each De-
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Fig. 7: Overview of Decent Server and Decent Component
cent Component. Self-attestation is performed by a Decent
Server whereas all component code resides in a Decent
Component. Each Decent node runs a single Decent Server,
regardless of how many components (or application instances)
it hosts.
Figure 6 illustrates the authentication process between a
Decent Server and an Decent Component. The Decent Server
first creates its self-attestation certificate. Using a secure chan-
nel established by the Local Attestation (LA), which provides
similar guarantees to RA but does not require verification
by the IAS since the components reside on the same CPU,
the Decent Component sends its Authorized List and its
own public key. The server then returns its self-attestation
certificate and a signed component certificate containing the
component’s public key, the digest of the component’s code,
and the component’s Authorized List.
Therefore, to authenticate a remote Decent Component, a
verifying node needs the Decent Component certificate, signed
by a Decent Server’s public key, as well as the Decent Server’s
self-attestation certificate, so that the authenticity of the Decent
Server’s key can be verified. For brevity, we will use self-
attestation certificate or just certificate as a shorthand for these
credentials necessary to verify a Decent Component.
Factoring out the self-attestation code keeps the self-
attestation protocol simple, easier to understand and audit,
and reduces the size of Decent Components. Furthermore,
sharing Decent Server for components residing on the same
CPU reduces the overhead of authentication on hosts that
run multiple components since only one Decent Server’s
self-attestation certificate is needed per node. And Figure 7
Code Digest Service Name
dff1...8e41 BillingService
3fb5...cc46 PaymentService
6233...0f6d TripMatcher
717e...5c1b TripMatcher
...
Fig. 8: Example Authorized List for DecentRide
shows the overview of the relationship between servers and
components.
Since each component is running in a separate enclave, they
cannot access the memory of the Decent Server or any other
Decent Component, so even a malicious component cannot
tamper with the authentication process of any other component.
B. Authorizing Decent Components
Figure 8 illustrates an example Authorized List for the
DecentRide example. Each entry in the Authorized List maps
the hash of a Decent Component’s code to the service name
it is authorized to implement. Note that a service (e.g., Trip-
Matcher) may be provided by multiple versions of enclaves
binary. Each Decent Component creates a unique key pair
that is not only bound (by the self-attestation certificate) to
a specific, authentic instance of Intel SGX enclave, but is
also bound to a specific immutable Authorized List which
contains a list of service names and the components that are
authorized to provide them. That means hosts cannot modify
the Authorized List without launching a new instance of the
Decent Component. Malicious components may present a false
Authorized List, but they cannot forge the self-attestation
certificate of an authorized component. Since any authentic
attestation report includes a hash of the component’s code,
malicious components cannot represent themselves as autho-
rized ones.
The (untrusted) host establishes the initial network connec-
tion and forwards messages for Decent Components. The De-
cent Component establishes a secure communication channel
using TLS on top of this connection. Components authenticate
themselves by submitting a self-attestation certificate, and a
remote connection from a component is only authorized if
the signatures of all certificates (including the IAS report) are
valid, and the Authorized Lists match. Further details about
establishing connections between components are discussed in
§IV-A.
Decent authorization is decentralized in the sense that hosts
may include arbitrary entities for the Authorized List of Decent
Components they host, but the contents of the Authorized
List constrains which remote components will accept their
connections. If a group of hosts colluded to include a malicious
component, any client or legitimate component attempting to
connect would see the unknown component in the Authorized
List, and refuse the connection.
Since the Authorized Lists of all connected Decent Compo-
nents must match exactly, each instance of a Decent application
is represented by a single Authorized List. As an example, con-
sider Figure 9 where a host attempts to introduce a malicious
version of the Driver Management component by launching
Trip 
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Driver 
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Fig. 9: Prevent malicious Decent Components by comparing
Authorized Lists
an authorized Payment Service with the malicious version
on its Authorized List. Even though the Payment Service is
authorized, the Trip Matcher rejects connections to and from
this component since its Authorized List list differs.
C. Dynamic component authorization
Requiring all Authorized Lists in an application instance
to match prevents unauthorized Decent Components from
connecting to the instance, but it also prevents new components
from being authorized dynamically. Applications may wish to
dynamically authorize components for a number of reasons,
but a common reason is to update components to add features,
improve performance, or fix bugs. Since Decent Components
are authorized based on a digest of their code, these new
components will not be allowed to connect to existing ap-
plication instances. To authorize new components, all existing
components must be restarted with a new Authorized List.
Requiring full system restarts for component updates goes
against the typical microservice-based design workflow where
components are frequently and independently updated, and
multiple versions of a component may co-exist at runtime. To
avoid the downtime associated with such restarts, Decent dis-
tinguishes two special roles that enable dynamic authorization
and revocation: Decent Verifiers and Decent Revokers.
A Decent Verifier is also an enclave program, which is per-
mitted to authorize new Decent Components (including other
verifiers) by an application instance. Comparing to trusted third
parties, trusting a verifier is expressing trust only in the specific
code running in the enclave, and the enclave platform ensures
that its behavior cannot deviate from that code. In addition,
when some verifier needs to be authorized by another verifier,
the developers must specify the service names for each level
explicitly, so there is a fixed depth for each valid chain.
Like any other Decent Component, in order to join an
application instance, the Decent Verifier must be listed as a
verifier on the Authorized Lists of the components in the
instance. In other words, all Decent Components must agree on
which verifiers are authorized to make dynamic authorization
decisions. By defining multiple verifier service names, appli-
cations can designate which verifiers are authorized for which
services. For instance, the DecentRide application could define
a BillingServiceVerifier name for authorizing BillingService
components, and a TripMatcherVerifier for authorizing Trip-
Matcher components.
Decent Verifiers authorize new Decent Components by
signing the their self-attestation certificate. A component is
authorized to connect to an application instance if (a) it appears
in the Authorized List for the expected service or (b) its self-
attestation certificate is signed by a verifier who appears in
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Fig. 10: Procedures for the example verifier
the Authorized List for the expected service verifier. In both
cases the Authorized List of the new component must match
the application instance’s. In the latter case, the verifier’s self-
attestation certificate must also contain a matching Authorized
List.
Decent Verifier may use any desired mechanism to decide
whether a Decent Component should be authorized. One
example approach is for the verifier to collect signed ap-
provals from an application’s “stakeholders,” e.g., the entities
whose data security may be affected by the authorization.
Figure 10 illustrates this workflow. The initial application
instance contains app A, app B, app C, and verifier, which
contains a hardcoded list of the public keys of stakeholders
whose approval is required for new authorizations.
When new Decent App is created, stakeholders that wish to
authorize new app create and sign new app’s code digest. These
approvals may be submitted to verifiers in a number of ways.
They could be sent by the stakeholders directly, or they could
be posted publicly and submitted by the host of new Decent
App. In either case, new Decent App authenticates itself to the
verifier using its self-attestation certificate. If the verifier has
received the necessary approvals, it responds by signing new
app’s certificate. Finally, new app joins the application instance
by presenting its self-attestation certificate, verifier’s signature,
and verifier’s certificate to app B. app B authorizes the new
app by verifying the self-attestation certificates and verifier’s
signature, and by checking that verifier is on its Authorized
List.
Other dynamic authorization approaches could remove the
need for external entities to explicitly authorize new com-
ponents. For example, Fabric [20] permits mobile code to
be downloaded from untrusted hosts, formally verified for
information-flow security, and linked into a distributed appli-
cation at runtime. A similar approach could be adapted for
Decent Verifier. Each new Decent Component’s source code
would be checked by the verifier against a formal specification
associated with the service it claims to implement. If the
source is successfully verified, the verifier compiles the source
to machine code, calculates the hash of the new component
and issues a signed approval. Any component presenting a
valid self-attestation certificate for the generated component
will be signed by the verifier, without the need for additional
approvals.
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D. Revocation
Decent Components may have their self-attestation certifi-
cates revoked in one of two ways. First, the IAS maintains
a number of revocation lists it uses to determine whether an
SGX platform (the chip, the credentials provisioned to it, or the
platform software itself) have been revoked. Since RA reports
are signed by a group signature to protect privacy, only Intel
is able to distinguish revoked platforms within a group. Even
with DCAP enabled, enclaves still need to acquire revocation
lists from local cache that is downloaded from IAS previously.
A Decent Component running on a host whose platform has
been revoked will be unable to refresh its self-attestation
certificate with the IAS server. Therefore it is prudent to set
self-attestation certificates to expire at reasonable intervals to
force periodic refreshing.5
Dynamic component revocation: If authorized Decent
Components are discovered to have latent vulnerabilities, or
are incompatible with new updates, these components should
no longer be permitted to connect to a Decent application
instance. However, dynamically revoking component autho-
rizations presents many of the same challenges as dynamic
authorization. Forcing full system restarts to modify Au-
thorized Lists leads to increased downtime, and may delay
when revocations could reasonably take effect. Furthermore,
modifying Authorized Lists does not address revocation for
dynamically authorized components.
Decent revokes authorized components using Component
Revocation Lists (CoRLs). A CoRL is similar to a Certificate
Revocation List [26], but instead of revoking a specific self-
attestation certificate, a CoRL entry is used to revoke any self-
attestation certificate generated for a specific Decent Compo-
nent. In other words, that component may no longer connect
to the instance, regardless of who is hosting it.
Decent Components called Decent Revokers maintain the
CoRLs associated with an application instance. Like verifiers,
revokers must appear on the Authorized Lists of all Decent
Components in the application instance, or must themselves
be authorized by a verifier.
Figure 11 illustrates a revocation workflow based on a
group of stakeholders, similar to the verifier example of
Figure 10. Stakeholders submit revocation requests to one or
more Decent Revoker containing the hash of the component
5While a malicious host may manipulate the operating system clock, the
SGX platform provides a trusted interval timer that can be used as the basis
of a mechanism to measure certificate lifetimes and force refreshes. We leave
the design and implementation of such a mechanism to future work.
whose authorization is to be revoked. Once a threshold of
revocation requests are received, the component’s hash is
added to the CoRL. Decent Components in the application
instance periodically request updates to the current CoRLs
from designated revokers. To prevent revocations from being
suppressed by malicious hosts, Decent Components refuse to
proceed if they do not receive a response from the revoker.
In some scenarios, it may be possible to revoke a compo-
nents without the intervention of an external entity. If evidence
that a components is compromised is mechanically verifiable,
revokers can offer API that allows nodes to submit messages or
private keys as evidence of compromise, so that revokers can
automatically add entries to the CoRL. Our Decent prototype
does not yet support revokers.
Revokers may revoke the authority of any Decent App or
Decent Verifier. Revoking the authority of a Decent Server
or Decent Revoker dynamically is problematic. The Decent
Server is designed to be small and rarely updated. Many
components in an application instance will likely share the
same Decent Server, so revoking the server would invalidate
the Decent certificates of many components. Moreover, Decent
Server are not allowed to be dynamically authorized, so
these components would be unable to rejoin unless there is
a different version of authorized Decent Server that has not
been revoked. Revoking a verifier can similarly cause many
components’ self-attestation certificates to be rejected, but
unlike the server scenario, these components may rejoin as
long as they are able to locate some other authorized verifier
that belongs to the instance.
Decent prohibits the revocation of Decent Revokers for
two reasons. First, the desired effect of revocation is unclear.
Entries on CoRL from a revoked revoker might not be repli-
cated on the CoRLs of other revokers, so discarding those
entries might allow compromised components to rejoin the
application instance. Accepting entries from a revoked revoker
is also inadequate, because some entries may be erroneous or
malicious (hence the revocation), but we cannot identify which
ones are. Second, if two different revokers place each other
on their CoRL, which revocation should take precedence is
unclear. Finally, revokers may be dynamically authorized by
verifiers, but these verifiers must be treated specially. Since
revoking the authority of a verifier of revokers would lead to
the same issues that accompany revoking a revoker directly,
the verifiers of revokers cannot have their authority revoked
dynamically. To avoid these issues, a CoRL should not be
consulted when authenticating revokers or their verifiers.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of our design using Intel
SGX for Windows. Our prototype consists of about 20k lines
of C++ (12k excluding header files) and uses Intel SGX SDK
version 2.3.101.50222, and mbedTLS version 2.16.0. While
some of our design decisions are informed by the constraints
of the SGX platform, our high-level design is applicable to
any TEE platform that supports RA and secure memory.
A. Decent Handshake
Decent Components communicate over TLS connections
that are authenticated with their certificates. The Decent hand-
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Fig. 12: Decent handshake workflow
shake extends the usual TLS handshake where both sides
authenticate with X.509 certificates.
Figure 12 illustrates the handshake procedure between two
Decent Apps. First, Decent App A and B exchange certificate
chains, whose root is the IAS report, which is included in the
Decent Server’s certificate, self-signed by the server itself. The
certificate of the Decent App or Decent Verifier is signed by
the Decent Server. Additionally, if the Decent App is verified
by the Decent Verifier, its certificate is signed by the verifier.
The mbedTLS library verifies the certificate chain and then
executes a callback function that performs additional checks
on their contents. First, the self-attestation report signature
is verified with Intel’s public Report Key. Next, the local
Authorized List is consulted to ensure the Decent Server’s hash
appears under the “DecentServer” service name. The Decent
App’s hash must either appear under the expected component
service name in the Authorized List, or its app certificate must
be signed by a verifier whose app certificate is included (and
verified) in the certificate chain, and whose hash appears under
the expected verifier service name. During this process, the
revocation list must be consulted to ensure all hashes—servers,
apps, and verifiers—are still valid and have not been revoked.6
Finally, the Authorized Lists included in each component’s
certificate are compared to the local Authorized List to ensure
they match. If all checks are successful, the connection is
accepted, otherwise it is rejected.
B. Using the Decent SDK
The Decent SDK provides a high-level API for establishing
secure channels between components that greatly simplifies
authentication and authorization of remote application compo-
nents while preserving fine-grained control over which com-
ponents are authorized to perform specific services.
System calls such as those that handle network connections
cannot be executed within an SGX enclave. Therefore the
standard approach [15] for establishing a secure channel with
an enclave is for untrusted code to first create (or accept) a
TCP connection to (or from) the remote host, and then act as
a proxy between the enclave and the network.
6Our current prototype does not yet support revocation.
1 void proc_trip_matcher_req(void* cnt_ptr)
2 {
3 //Get DECENT authorization data:
4 //key pair, certificate, auth list, etc.
5 States& state = GetStateSingleton();
6
7 EnclaveCntTranslator connection(cnt_ptr);
8
9 //Configure TLS session
10 std::shared_ptr<TlsConfigWithName> tlsCfg =
11 std::make_shared<TlsConfigWithName>(
12 state,
13 TlsConfig::Mode::ServerVerifyPeer,
14 "TripMatcher",
15 GetSessionTicketMgr());
16
17 //Create TLS channel
18 TlsCommLayer tls(
19 connection, tlsCfg, true, nullptr);
20 tls.Recv(/* ... */);
21 tls.Send(/* ... */);
22 }
Fig. 13: Setting Up A TLS Connection to Decent App with
Authorized List
10 std::shared_ptr<TlsConfigWithVerifier> tlsCfg =
11 std::make_shared<TlsConfigWithVerifier>(
12 state,
13 TlsConfig::Mode::ServerVerifyPeer,
14 "TripMatcherVerifier"
15 "TripMatcher",
16 GetSessionTicketMgr());
Fig. 14: Setting Up A TLS Connection to Decent App with
verifiers
Figure 13 shows a fragment of code from the Payment
Service component in DecentRide that handles incoming re-
quests from the Trip Matcher component. The void* pointer
cnt_ptr points to a TCP connection created by the untrusted
code and passed into the enclave. The authorization data of
this instance of component is retrieved on line 5, and wrapper
class for the TCP connection is instantiated on line 7. Lines
10-15 create an object that configures how the connection
should be authenticated and authorized. The authorization data
state is passed in to provide the TLS library with the
component’s key pair, certificate chain, and Authorized List.
The mode ServerVerifyPeer indicates that the Payment
Service is expecting an incoming request (hence Server)
and should request a certificate from the remote component
(hence VerifyPeer). Line 14 specifies that the expected ser-
vice name of the remote component is TripMatcher, thus
the service name TripMatcher must be listed under the
component’s hash entry in the Authorized List. On line 15,
GetSessionTicketMgr() retrieves a reference to a TLS
session ticket manager that helps resume sessions to avoid re-
negotiating the TLS handshake unnecessarily. Lines 18 and 19
establish the TLS channel using the connection wrapper and
the configuration object, and lines 20 and 21 use the channel
to receive and send data with the remote component.
Permitting TripMatcher components to be authorized using
a verifier only requires a few modifications to Lines 10-16 of
the Payment Service code above. In Figure 14, we instead
create a shared pointer to a TlsConfigWithVerifier
object, whose constructor accepts an additional service name,
TripMatcherVerifier for the verifier service name per-
mitted to authorize TripMatcher components dynami-
cally. This configuration requires that any verifiers of a
TripMatcher component be listed under the service name
TripMatcherVerifier in the Authorized List.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
We have formalized and verified the secrecy and au-
thentication properties of the Decent protocol design using
ProVerif [13]. ProVerif [13] is an automated verification tool
for cryptographic protocols. We can formalized the behavior
our protocol with the prove code, describe the scenario that
we want to test with, and query ProVerif that will the secret
be revealed to the attacker, or can the attacker manipulate
a message without being detected. Meanwhile, the attacker
modeled in ProVerif knows the full process of the protocol that
we just defined; and is able to intercept and manipulate any
message transmitted within the message channel. That is being
said, if developers strictly follow the formalization in prove
code, they will get the same guarantee proved by ProVerif
(assuming their implementation is flawless).
Our ProVerif formalization consists of 1095 lines of code
and comments for the core implementation and 1437 lines
for the verification scenarios. Our formalization follows the
threat model defined in §III. We use the ProVerif standard
library for definitions of cryptographic algorithms used in
our implementation, which assume that encryption and digital
signatures are uncompromisable if used properly.
We defined six process types representing the building
blocks of the Decent architecture: Decent Server, Decent App,
Decent Revoker, Decent Verifier, and Verified Decent App (a
Decent App that is authorized by a Decent Verifier). We also
defined additional processes for modeling malicious Decent
Components and Decent Servers. For simplicity, we only
consider verification of components from the perspective of
(honest) Decent Apps; the verification process is identical for
clients of Decent services.
Each Decent App process loads an Authorized List at the
beginning of the process. That Authorized Lists of all processes
are given by an attacker representing the untrusted host, except
one honest app who is sending the secret data or receiving a
computation result. The authorized Decent Components and
Decent Servers are represented by honest processes, since a
host cannot alter its behavior. Any data generated within the
enclave remains secret unless communicated over a channel
visible to the attacker. Attackers may read and manipulate
any data transmitted via message channels, and may create
messages using any material they obtain by reading and
computing messages.
We assume one IAS report key, held only by the IAS
process. The corresponding public key is used to verify the
IAS report. Each enclave possesses a provisioning key for
signing quotes. For simplicity, we assume enclaves hold the
same private provisioning key. The IAS process uses the public
provisioning key to verify quotes. Each enclave platform has
a unique local report key used for local attestation (LA).
Decent App Verified Decent App
Secrecy 2 minutes 8 hours
Authenticity 4 hours 61 hours
Fig. 15: Verification times
Attacker-controlled Decent Components and Decent
Servers are expressed by issuing RA and LA reports in an
honest process, but leaking the component’s private key to the
attacker. Hence, attackers will be able to authenticate as the
component without being bound by the behavior of the original
process. Note that the IAS report key, provisioning key, and
local report keys remain secret. We assume revocation lists
and hashes of approved Decent Apps are provided to Decent
Revokers and Decent Verifiers via out of band process.
We verified the secrecy and authenticity of the data trans-
mitted between Decent Components, using two verification
scenarios. In one, we instantiated two Decent Apps: one
sending the secret data, the other receiving the data. The other
task is identical, but between Verified Decent Apps. These
processes are composed with instances of the other process
types, including those representing malicious enclaves. Any
of these processes may be replicated an arbitrary number of
times. Figure 18 in Appendix B illustrates the process diagram
for our formalization.
Table 15 lists the verification times for our ProVerif for-
malization. Verifying data secrecy for Decent Apps completed
relatively quickly. Verifying secrecy for Verified Decent Apps
required significantly more time. Verifying authenticity for
Verified Apps required decomposing the verification problem
into three simpler tasks. First, we prove that the Authorized
List stored in the certificate issued by Decent Verifiers is
identical to the Authorized List loaded by the Verified De-
cent App, and that verifier only issue certificates to Verified
Decent Apps with the same Authorized List loaded. Next,
we prove that Verified Decent Apps only accept peers with
identical Authorized Lists in their certificates. Finally, we load
all Decent Apps with the same Authorized List and verify
the authenticity property. Our complete verification code and
reports are available on GitHub [18].
VI. EXAMPLE DECENT APPLICATIONS
A. DecentRide
We used our prototype to implement two Decent applica-
tions. The first application is an implementation of DecentRide,
discussed in §II. DecentRide components are hosted by a
distributed network of mutually-distrustful nodes.
Each DecentRide component (circles in Figure 4) imple-
ments a microservice—a small, targeted service that is loosely
coupled with the other components by a simple application
protocol. With the exception of the TripMatcher, DecentRide
components maintain no local state. This design makes it easy
to launch (or halt) component replicas on demand and balance
request load among hosts. DecentRide hosts are incentivized
to host components by compensation they receive (calculated
by the Billing Service) from payments for trips (processed
by the Payment Service). Passengers and drivers register and
authenticate to the Passenger Management and Driver Manager
services, and receive credentials that are presented to (and
verified by) the DecentRide components they interact with. All
user data provided to the management services is authenticated
encrypted with keys derived from a component’s seal key and
the Authorized List as described in §III-B. Thus hosts have no
access to the user data they store, even if they launch malicious
DecentRide instances.
When a passenger wishes to find a ride on DecentRide,
they contact a Trip Planner service which finds a path between
their current location and the desired destination. The Trip
Planner submits the proposed route to the Billing Service
to get a total price for the trip, including fees for the hosts
operating DecentRide components. This price quote is signed
by the Billing Service and returned to the passenger (via
the Trip Planner) along with the Billing Service’s certificate
chain, which the passenger and Trip Matcher uses to verify
the authenticity of the price quote.
Drivers advertise their availability by sending their location
data to a Trip Matcher, which replies with a list of nearby
passengers and their desired destinations. Once a driver selects
a passenger, their contact information will be exchanged, and
the passenger will receive the current location of the driver.
At the destination, both driver and passenger must confirm to
the Trip Matcher that the trip completed successfully, and only
then does the Trip Matcher initiate payment for the trip with
the Payment Service. The Payment Service obtains payment
information from the management services and submits the
transaction to the relevant financial entities.
To prevent abuse such as fake trip requests designed to
probe for driver locations, or fake driver locations to probe for
passenger locations and destinations, driver and passenger in-
teractions with the Trip Matcher are logged to their respective
management services. The Trip Matcher will not proceed with
a driver or passenger request until it receives confirmation from
the service that the logged action was successfully received,
ensuring that malicious users cannot bypass the abuse detection
by suppressing these logging messages.
B. DecentHT
To complement to DecentRide, we have implemented De-
centHT, a simple distributed hashtable based on Chord [27].
Running each node within an enclave lets us store confidential
information at untrusted hosts and control access to that
information using Decent Authorized Lists. Sealed data stored
in the DecentHT can be accessed based on a consistent hash
function applied to the desired key, just as in the Chord system.
A non-enclave alternative to DecentHT could store en-
crypted values that were inaccessible to their hosts, but control-
ling access to the decryption keys introduces extra complexity.
DecentHT nodes encrypt their data using their own sealing
keys, and only provide access to authorized entities. It requires
no additional key management beyond the Decent authentica-
tion mechanisms. Executing the Chord protocol logic within
the enclave rules out attacks based on manipulating protocol
messages or routing attacks since even malicious hosts process
messages with trusted code. Host may still, of course, suppress
incoming or outgoing messages. And hosts might still learn
some information from analyzing communication patterns be-
tween nodes, but at a much slower rate when there is a high
ratio of keys to nodes. Moreover, additional data replication
scheme is needed since neither enclave nor Decent guarantees
availability, and some version of DecentHT nodes could be
revoked at any time.
DecentHT derives each node’s identifier, which determines
which items it is responsible for, using the Decent seal key.
This approach prevents many Sybil attacks [28] since every
DecentHT component launched with the same Authorized List
on the same CPU will receive the same identifier. Components
launched with different Authorized Lists will be unable to
connect to the same DecentHT instance.
DecentHT network can be used by a DecentRide instance
to store passenger and driver data used by the management
services. Drivers and passengers interact with the management
services, which may cause them to create, fetch, or modify data
stored in DecentHT. As in Chord, requests will be routed to the
appropriate node. When the component responsible for the key
is reached, the component loads the associated (sealed) data
into the enclave and sends it to the requesting application.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
We evaluate the overhead of Decent authentication and
authorization by comparing the performance of DecentHT on
the YCSB benchmark [14] to an implementation that uses a RA
approach as suggested by the Intel SGX SDK documentation.
Since the SGX RA Only approach does not support mutual
authentication of the DecentHT components, we omit code
checking identities against an expected value. In our results,
we refer to the Decent implementation as Decent RA and the
SGX SDK implementation as SGX RA Only.
For additional context, we also evaluate the performance
of two non-enclave implementations to examine the baseline
performance of the system without the overhead of authen-
tication or SGX operations. In one version, the DecentHT
code executes outside of the enclave and communicates over
TLS channels without exchanging and verifying certificates. In
the second version, we additionally encrypt the stored records
with a symmetric key, similar to how the enclave versions seal
the records for storage outside of the enclave’s memory. We
refer to these implementations as TLS Only and TLS+Sealing,
respectively.
Our experimental setup is similar to management services
accessing data stored in DecentHT, as discussed in §VI-B; but
instead of DecentRide components, we created a small Decent
App that exposes Java bindings for the YCSB benchmark to
invoke. We used Workload B, a “mostly read” workload with
95% reads and 5% writes, with uniform request distributions
for all our experiments below. A read operation consists of
one lookup request to determine the node responsible for
storing the desired record, followed by a request to fetch the
record. Write operations are one lookup request followed by
an update request. Each DecentHT node loads approximately
3,000 records. To ensure a relatively even distribution of
records across nodes, we disabled DecentHT’s Sybil resistance
and explicitly specified node ID’s that were evenly spaced.
Each test measures performance for 60 seconds after a 60-
second warm up phase. We repeat each test three times and
report the median of measurements as points on the graph,
while, minimum and maximum values as error bars, which
are not distinguishable at the scale of the evaluation graphs.
DecentHT nodes execute on a single 3.6 GHz Intel i7-
7700 with 4 cores (8 logical) running Windows 10. The server
has 16 GB of RAM, with 128MB (the maximum permitted)
dedicated to SGX. Records stored at each node are sealed and
stored in non-enclave memory. Each node is assigned its own
logical core, with two cores reserved for the network stack
and the Intel AESM service which is responsible for managing
interactions between the operating system and SGX enclaves.
Clients execute on a single 3.4 GHz Intel i3-7100T with 2
cores (4 logical) running Windows 10. The client machine has
4GB of RAM and 128 MB is dedicated to SGX. The client
and server machines are connected via 1-Gigabit Ethernet.
SGX requires that all thread-local memory be pre-allocated,
thus the maximum number of threads used by an SGX applica-
tion is fixed at runtime and is limited by the memory available
to SGX. For the DecentHT nodes, we specified 18 threads
for handling incoming requests from either clients or peers,
6 threads for forwarding the finger table lookup requests to
other peers, and 2 threads for replying requests received from
other peers. In the SGX RA Only experiments, 14 additional
threads are used for requesting quotes for the enclave itself.
These threads are unnecessary for the Decent experiments, but
we reserve the same amount of memory in both cases. Using
the additional memory to allocate more threads for the Decent
experiment would further improve Decent’s performance over
the SGX RA Only case.
We limited YCSB to spawn a maximum of 50 threads, the
maximum number of concurrent YCSB components that fit in
the available enclave memory. This did not limit the throughput
of the SGX-based implementations, which were fully loaded
at around 40 client threads.
The RA process results in a shared secret between the
enclave and the host verifying the enclave’s attestation report.
In the non-Decent implementation we follow the approach
suggest by examples distributed with the Intel SGX SDK
to establish a secure channel using AES-GCM encryption
between the distributed hash table and the application nodes. In
addition, we give nonces and randomized Initial Vectors (IVs)
to the encryption process for all messages, and implemented a
mechanism similar to TLS session tickets [29] that permitted
clients to resume sessions across connections without storing
state on the server. The purpose of this protocol is simply to
approximate the security guarantees of Decent’s authenticated
channels using secrets shared during the attestation process
and avoid the additional overhead of a TLS handshake.
Since our experiments generate many IAS requests in the
SGX RA Only case, we use a simple IAS simulator to avoid
violating the terms of use for our Intel Developer account.
Instead of sending requests to the IAS, all requests are sent
to our simulator which replays a single hardcoded response
from the official IAS. Requestors follow the same protocol
as they would for a real IAS request, but they ignore the
nonce in our simulated response to allow us to replay the same
response multiple times. The response times of our simulated
IAS are gamma-distributed with parameters estimated from
30 IAS API response time samples collected from the IAS
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Fig. 16: Requests Per Session versus Throughput
portal. For retrieving the current EPID signature revocation
list, we measured a mean response time of 39 ms with
standard deviation 24 ms. For retrieving an attestation report
we measured a mean response time of 255 ms with standard
deviation 70 ms.
B. Results
Both the Decent RA implementation and the SGX Only
implementation amortize the cost of authentication over the
length of a session. Therefore the negative impact of authen-
tication on system throughput will decrease as the average
session length increases. To analyze the tradeoff between
authentication overhead and session length, we ran each im-
plementation with six server nodes on the YCSB benchmark
while varying the number of requests each client made before
establishing a new session. For the Decent RA implementation,
each new session involved a TLS handshake and the exchange
and verification of self-attestation certificate chains. For the
SGX RA Only implementation, each new session required
a new RA. The non-enclave versions required only a TLS
handshake with no certificate verification.
Figure 16 presents the results of these experiments. The
non-enclave performance improvement plateaus at about 200
requests per session, with the TLS+Sealing implementation
achieving a lower throughput due to the extra overhead of
encrypting and decrypting the stored records. Between 10 and
400 requests per session, Decent RA significantly outperforms
the SGX RA Only implementation. For long sessions of 800
requests, Decent RA and SGX get roughly the same through-
put. Beyond 800 requests, the SGX RA Only performance
approaches the TLS Only implementations, which we attribute
to the additional messages required to resume TLS sessions
compared to our custom SGX RA session ticket scheme.
Figure 17 plots the tradeoff between latency and throughput
for sessions of length 50, 200, and 600. We gradually increased
the target throughput and measured the average response time
for requests. At 50 requests per session, the difference between
Decent RA and SGX RA is most pronounced, with latency
rapidly increasing for SGX RA as throughput exceeds 150
requests per second. At 200 request per session, the behavior
has begun to converge, but Decent RA still significantly out-
performs SGX RA. At 600 requests per session, however, their
performance is roughly equivalent. Note that the performance
of the TLS Only implementation is mostly unaffected for these
session lengths.
We also measured the latency of requests as the number
of nodes increases from three to six to sanity-check whether
Decent RA affects scalability. As expected, latency in both
implementations is largely unaffected by the small increase in
nodes. However, the average latency for Decent RA ( 50ms)
is almost four times lower than SGX RA ( 190ms).
VIII. RELATED WORK
Several recent projects use enclaves and RA to provide
confidentiality and/or integrity for distributed applications, but
almost none address the problem of mutual authentication,
though Beekman et al.[6] suggest a work-around for an ap-
plication with two components by building both of them into
one enclave binary and allowing it switching between different
operation mode. This approach is impractical in a distributed
application with large number of components, since it will
generate a gigantic enclave binary and make the code hard
to maintain; besides, it requires rebuilding the entire binary
even if there is just one bug fix in one of those components.
VC3 [30] allows a user to launch MapReduce workloads using
cloud-hosted SGX enclaves, ensuring the confidentiality of
the processed data and the integrity of the results. VC3 jobs
distribute a single enclave binary to each host, avoiding any
mutual authentication issues.
Other systems deal with mutual authentication using a
external party. Ryoan [2] authenticates the components using
RA, but modules are identified by a public key that signs the
module rather than the code itself, while the corresponding
private key could be a key that is stored outside of an enclave.7
MesaTEE [31] solves the problem of mutual authentication
by relying on third-party auditors [4], which sign binaries
that pass an audit process. Decent does not place trust in
external entities (which could be compromised) to authorize
enclaves, but requires hosts in an application instance to agree
upon which components are authorized to implement which
services, and enables clients to verify which components are
included in an instance before using its services. Panoply [5]
partitions applications into multiple small enclave components.
To address mutual authentication issue, it relies on a shim
library to assign names to each enclave and maintain the
mapping from name to enclaves’ hash. However, it is not
clear how the shim library obtains the hash and enforces the
mapping, since mutual authentication is not its main focus.
CCF [3] uses a distributed ledger to manage which TEE
components are enabled. This fills a similar role to the Au-
thorized List in Decent. CCF nodes are more heavyweight
than Decent nodes because they must participate in a con-
sensus protocol to process requests. Since CCF relies on
consensus protocols to protect the integrity of the list of
authorized components, the security of CCF against attacks
by malicious components relies on the security assumptions
of these protocols (e.g., > 2/3 of hosts are honest, for
BFT protocols). Decent offers stronger integrity: regardless of
how many hosts are honest, no malicious components may
7The authors claim that Ryoan could also support identities based on code
hashes, but it is unclear how they would address mutual authentication.
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Fig. 17: Average Latency versus Throughput
be introduced into an application instance. Decent does not
offer availability guarantees, but coupling Decent with a BFT
protocol could provide availability guarantees similar to CCF
without sacrificing integrity.
Decent’s self-attestation process is similar to a now-
common approach to authenticating TLS connections with
enclaves. Knauth et al. [15] describe the process of using
RA to bind a public key to an enclave that generated it and
include the report in a self-signed certificate. This certificate is
used to establish the TLS connection allowing the remote host
authenticate the key. Rust SGX [16] and Open Enclave [17]
offer similar support. Similarly, OPERA [32] proposes a RA
services that is separated from the native RA protocol of SGX,
but during its preparation phase, a report generated by IAS is
still needed.
All the above TLS approaches support, in principle, the
option of self-attestation where the host of the enclave par-
ticipates on both sides of the attestation process to aid in the
creation of the certificate. None address the issue of mutual
authentication of enclaves and therefore cannot support appli-
cations like DecentRide or DecentHT. Furthermore, our results
in §VII quantify the performance gains of self-attestation over
on-demand attestation for short sessions.
Other work has focused on supporting more general sys-
tems programming within SGX enclaves. SCONE [33] and
Graphene-SGX [34] support standard library functions not
natively available to enclaves, such as filesystem and network
I/O. In general, these projects focus more on the local secure
systems programming aspects of using SGX enclaves, and do
not directly support RA.
Intel’s DCAP support permits customized SGX RA proto-
cols without contacting the IAS (except during setup). Alter-
native TEE designs such as Sanctum [35] and Keystone [36]
allow direct verification of a public key certificate chain signed
by the manufacturer. Keystone also supports additional roots of
trust beside the manufacturer. DCAP, Sanctum, and Keystone’s
approaches to RA could reduce the overhead of RA similar to
using self-attestation certificates. They do not however, address
mutual attestation between enclaves.
Key Separation and Sharing (KSS) is a recent feature added
to the SGX SDK that help differentiate multiple instances
of the same enclave. For example, Decent could use KSS
to derive different seal keys for each application instance by
placing a hash of the Authorized List in the configuration pa-
rameters instead of using our HKDF approach (Appendix A).
Furthermore, since we can specify an Authorized List in terms
of each component’s MRENCLAVE identity, and bind it to
the configuration id used for attestation, KSS could provide
an alternate implementation path for Decent’s authorization
mechanism. Nevertheless, although KSS provides additional
tools for mutual authentication, it doesn’t provide a solution.
Any KSS-based approach would need to address the same
challenges as Decent, but like DCAP, KSS could provide an
alternate implementation path for some of Decent’s features.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the Decent Application Platform,
a framework for building secure decentralized applications.
Decent Components authenticate each other using a remote
attestation protocol that ensures each component agrees on
what components are authorized to interact with the application
instance, supporting mutual authentication without requiring
a universally-trusted entity to authorize components. verifiers
and revokers allow new components to be authorized or
revoked dynamically. We formalized Decent in ProVerif and
verified that it protects the secrecy and authenticity of applica-
tion data. We implemented the Decent SDK in C++ using Intel
SGX, and evaluated it with two example applications. Decent-
Ride demonstrates the expressiveness of Decent framework
when building applications with multiple enclave components,
while the evaluation based on DecentHT shows that, for short
sessions, Decent provides 7.5x higher throughput and 3.67x
lower latency comparing to the non-Decent implementation.
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APPENDIX
A. Accessing and Migrating Sealed Data
Persistent data stored by an enclave must be encrypted with
keys that the enclave maintains access to across reboots of the
enclave process. Embedding secret keys in enclave code is
obviously insecure, and keys that are stored in the (encrypted)
enclave memory will be lost if the process exits. Intel SGX
provides two key-derivation schemes for creating seal keys that
encrypt data for persistent storage outside of the enclave. One
scheme, MRSIGNER, uses the signer (typically the author)
of the enclave to derive seal keys, meaning that any enclave
binary signed by the same key may decrypt sealed data. The
other scheme, MRENCLAVE, uses the enclave’s code hash to
derive keys, meaning that only that enclave may decrypt sealed
data.
Neither of these key-derivation schemes alone are appro-
priate for Decent applications. The author of an enclave has
no special authority in Decent. Entities do not place trust in
the authors of components, only in the code itself. However,
allowing a Decent Component to access sealed data could be
insecure if the component belongs to a different application
instance than the one that sealed the data. Therefore, the
Decent SDK uses a HMAC-based key-derivation function [37]
(HKDF) to derive a key from the MRENCLAVE-derived key
that binds the key to a specific Authorized List.
Decent’s HKDF scheme prevents malicious hosts from
using legitimate components to leak sealed data to a malicious
components (since the Authorized List would be different),
and malicious components from directly deriving another
component’s seal key (since the enclave’s hash would be
different). However, it also implies that sealed data must be
explicitly migrated from one application instance to another if
the Authorized List changes or a component is upgraded.
One approach to data migration is to implement a migration
API by which a new component can request sealed data from
an existing component before it is replaced. For example, if a
new component is authorized by the verifier, it can contact a
specified component from which to migrate data and seal the
retrieved data under its own key. In some scenarios, however, it
may be unreasonable to use the existing component to migrate
sealed data. For example, if the Authorized List is changed, or
a component is about to be revoked because of a vulnerability,
delaying revocation to migrate data to a replacement com-
ponent could subject the application instance to exploitation.
Guarding against sudden revocation of a component with a
large store of sealed data requires sealing the data under a key
that can be provisioned to “recovery components” that can
access and migrate data securely in the event the component’s
authority is revoked.
Note that TEE mechanisms like Intel SGX cannot on their
own be used to guarantee recovery of sealed data. A malicious
host may deny access to sealed data at any time. We are
currently investigating mechanisms to integrate into the Decent
framework that would support availability guarantees in addi-
tional to the current confidentiality and integrity guarantees.
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